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I. INTRODUCTION
This Brief addresses an infringement suit brought against
Defendants for violating Plaintiffs patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Salvador Dolly has no legal or
inherent rights to his excised tissue, and, therefore, no entitlement to
profits that have arisen from the research that Plaintiff has
conducted. Plaintiff argues that the patent withstands all challenges
of patentability, including §§ 101-103 subject matter, utility, novelty,
and obviousness. Finally, because the ownership rights in question
have the potential to drastically affect the future of scientific and
medical research, principles of public policy require that Plaintiffs
patent and ensuing rights be affirmed and enforced.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 31, 1998, Defendant Salvador Dolly (Dolly) provided
Advanced Genetic Testing Company (AGTC) with a whole-blood
sample. Dolly signed a consent form that allowed AGTC to carry
out genetic testing on his blood sample. A true and correct copy of
this form appears as Appendix A of the Complaint.!
A short time after AGTC completed Dolly's genetic testing,
Plaintiff NuGenEra, Inc. (NuGenEra) purchased many tissue samples
that were no longer needed. This service by AGTC included the
tissue submitted by Dolly. NuGenEra used these tissue samples for
medical research purposes. After performing a significant amount of
labor, NuGenEra determined that Dolly's tissue sample is completely
resistant to Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HiV). At this point,
NuGenEra embarked on a program to sequence the genome
corresponding to this HIV immune tissue. The sequencing revealed
a unique combination of alleles (gene variants), designated P1-P 10.
NuGenEra filed a patent application on the full "Dolly Genome"
and a combination of genes (P or P 1-P 10) suggested by the sequence
comparison. U.S. Patent Number F6,635,271 ('271 patent) was
1. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review will not be publishing the
Complaint or Appendix A referenced in Plaintiffs Points and Authorities.
Appendix A contains NuGenEra's Consent Form at issue in this case. To
obtain a copy of the Complaint and Appendix A, see The Program for Law and
Technology at California Institute of Technology & Loyola Law School Web
site, at http://techlaw.lls.edu/atc3/pleadings.html.
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issued to Plaintiff on May 28, 2000. NuGenEra notified Dolly of his
immunity to HIV.
NuGenEra's '271 patent contains three independent claims.
Independent Claim 1 comprises the entire Dolly Genome.
Independent Claim 2 comprises the ten genes of the P locus (P1-
P10). Claim 3 covers an immortalized human cell line comprising
the genetic composition of Claim 1.
On November 30, 2000, Dolly and a limited partnership initiated
by Dolly, DollyDeal Ltd. (DollyDeal), sold a whole-blood sample to
Dr. William Morgan of the University of California.
On December 12, 2000, Dolly and DollyDeal sold a whole-
blood sample to Dr. Paul Hu of California State University.
On January 20, 2001, Dolly and DollyDeal attempted to
negotiate the sale of a whole-blood sample to Dr. Antoinette Avazian
of Infants' Hospital. Dr. Avazian did not accept Dolly's offer.
III. ARGUMENT
A. Dolly Retains No Rights to His Excised Tissue
Plaintiff contends that it committed no wrongdoing in obtaining
a sample of Dolly's blood. Dolly gave up the rights to the blood
sample when he gave the sample to AGTC. AGTC then transferred
the blood to NuGenEra, giving NuGenEra the blood and the right to
perform research on it.
1. Dolly has no ownership rights to the blood sample
a. AGTC fulfilled any fiduciary duty it had to Dolly and made a
legal transaction in providing the sample to Plaintiff
At the time AGTC received Dolly's blood sample, it had no
intention of selling or profiting from Dolly's blood in any way.
Since AGTC performed the tests on Dolly's blood in good faith and
in agreement with the signed form (see Pl.'s Compl., App. A),
AGTC fulfilled its fiduciary duty to Dolly. Therefore, AGTC was
the legal owner of the blood sample.
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b. Dolly retains no legal ownership or control over the blood sample
by contract or statute
The consent form signed by Dolly makes no mention of how the
blood is to be disposed. Dolly had no expectation of control over the
blood sample. At no point did Dolly attempt to exercise control of
the blood sample once it was removed.
Dolly is also limited in the amount of control he can exercise
over the blood sample by California statute. "California statutory
law drastically limits any continuing interest of a patient in excised
cells." Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 137,
793 P.2d 479, 489, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 156 (1990). California's
limitation on the rights of patients to maintain control of excised
cells stems from such statutes as section 7054.4 of the California
Health and Safety Code, which states: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, recognizable anatomical parts, human tissues,
anatomical human remains, or infectious waste following conclusion
of scientific use shall be disposed of by interment, incineration, or
any other method determined by the state department to protect the
public health and safety." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4
(West Supp. 2001). Clearly, the right to dispose of excised cells is
not reserved to the patient. Therefore, AGTC had the right to
dispose of its blood samples by transferring them to NuGenEra, and
no liability was transferred to Plaintiff by doing so.
2. Legal ownership of the blood sample rightfully belongs to
NuGenEra
a. recognizing a patient's inherent ownership in excised cells would
impose great hardship to medical research and defeat public policy
Granting ownership of the blood sample to Dolly would present
enormous logistical problems to companies such as AGTC. Such a
policy would place a colossal burden on the part of AGTC by forcing
it to find out how each patient wants his or her blood sample to be
disposed. It would also severely hinder the ability of companies,
such as NuGenEra, to perform needed research by drastically
reducing their access to blood samples. Absent specific requests
from individuals, the most practical method for dealing with legally
obtained blood samples would be to default ownership to the current
holder of the sample.
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Courts now recognize that an "important policy consideration is
that we not threaten with disabling civil liability innocent parties who
are engaged in socially useful activities, such as researchers who
have no reason to believe that their use of a particular cell sample is,
or may be, against a donor's wishes." Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 143, 793
P.2d at 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160. Further, "[1]iability based upon
existing disclosure obligations, rather than an unprecedented
extension of the conversion theory, protects patients' rights of
privacy and autonomy without unnecessarily hindering research."
Id. at 144, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161. In this way,
Plaintiff would still have obtained legal ownership of the sample
even if AGTC had violated its fiduciary duties. NuGenEra had no
reason to question the valid ownership of the cells they obtained
from AGTC. It would be time consuming, costly, irrational, and
outside the legal duties of NuGenEra to require it to gain further
consent before performing its research. The current policy prevents
the unnecessary hindrance of research.
Having obtained Dolly's tissue sample legally and with
legitimate purpose, NuGenEra thus owns the rights to its use and
disposition, which includes the right to perform tests on the blood
sample obtained from Dolly.
B. Plaintiffs '271 Patent Is Valid
Plaintiffs patent meets each element of patentability that
Defendant Dolly challenges under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103. Section
101 of the statute provides that: "Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
1. The patent satisfies the statutory subject matter
requirement under § 101
a. Congress intended for patent laws to be construed broadly, and
courts have repeatedly upheld the patentability of gene sequences as
a manufacture or composition of matter so long as utility is disclosed
Congress contemplated that patent laws be construed broadly in
scope as indicated by its expansive use of terminology. The four
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patentable categories specified under § 101 as statutory subject
matter are those of process, machine, manufacture, and composition
of matter. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), the
Court held that living things could also be considered nonnatural,
human-made inventions. Indeed, the Supreme Court warned in
Diamond that we "'should not read into the patent laws limitations
and conditions which the legislature has not expressed,"' id. at 308
(quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178,
199 (1933)). The court based this warning on its examination of
legislative history, which shows that Congress intended statutory
subject matter "to include anything under the sun that is made by"
man." Id. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952)). Courts
have thus included nonnaturally occurring, living inventions
"'having a distinctive name, character [and] use"' within that scope.
Id. at 309-10 (quoting.Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615
(1887)) (alteration in original). When considering this question of
patentable subject matter, the Supreme Court has surmised that only
such concepts as physical phenomena, laws of nature, and abstract
ideas may not qualify, but these are intangible categories to which
the claims of Plaintiff s patent do not belong. See Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,
130 (1948). Genomic sequences and combinations have therefore
been, and are increasingly now, recognized as compositions of
matter due to their existence as isolated and purified chemical
compounds that have resulted from laborious time and research.
Claim 1 and Claim 2 of Plaintiff's patent are respectively
comprised of an isolated composition and a combination of nucleic
acid sequences, both of which fall into the category of "composition
of matter" within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101, due to their
isolated and purified states. It is a well-established principle that an
invention is not per se unpatentable simply because the composition
is isolated from nature. The court in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K
Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) affirmed the
patentability of adrenaline and the idea that isolated compounds from
nature are eligible subject matter, opining that "even if it were
merely an extracted product without change, there is no rule that
such products are not patentable." Id. at 103. Likewise, sixty years
later the court in In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394 (1970) held
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extracted human and animal prostaglandin to be patentable because
those compounds "do not exist in nature in pure form." Id. at 1401.
In the twenty years since the Supreme Court made its landmark
ruling in Diamond that a microorganism could be the "result of
human ingenuity and research," Diamond, 447 U.S. at 313, patents
have been increasingly awarded to sequenced genes that code for
proteins found to be useful in detecting and treating diseases in
which they play a significant role. Such genes include ones that
contribute to the occurrence of myotonic dystrophy and Machado-
Joseph disease or help alleviate low blood pressure.
2
Defendant Dolly's contention that an isolated genome sequence
and gene combination is unpatentable subject matter, solely because
it was extracted from Dolly's donated tissue sample, is not consistent
with the current practice of U.S. patent law. The patented product
exists in an altered and useful form, physically different from its
precursor tissue, as a direct result of Plaintiff's work. It satisfies the
broad, nonrestrictive reading of composition of matter that courts
have agreed Congress had in mind when writing the law. After
Plaintiffs discovery of the gene and the subsequent research it
conducted to isolate and purify its beneficial properties, the invention
became a physically transformed product, separate from Dolly's
tissue, and certainly qualified as a nonnatural product of human
ingenuity.
A nucleic acid that has been removed from the body and isolated
in vitro by separating it from other biological compounds is thus a
chemical composition of matter, as it cannot normally be found
existing in nature in its altered form. Inventiveness of the discovery
thus lies in the extraction of a previously unknown Deoxyribonucleic
Acid (DNA) sequence. Likewise, the combination of genes P1-P10,
isolated from Dolly's cells, could be considered a "manufacture" due
to its ultimately nonnatural, man-made isolated state, separate from
the rest of the tissue. It may also qualify as a "composition of
matter" based on its selective, nonnatural combination. Plaintiff s
2. See generally U.S. Patent No. 5,977,333 (issued Nov. 2, 1999) ("DNA
sequence encoding the myotonic dystrophy gene and uses thereof[.]"); U.S.
Patent No. 5,840,491 (issued Nov. 24, 1998) ("DNA sequence encoding the
Machado-Joseph disease gene and uses thereofl.]"); U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008,
(issued Oct. 27, 1987) ("DNA sequences encoding erythropoietin[.]").
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claims thus satisfy the conceptions of statutory subject matter that
courts have always understood and continually affimned.
Claim 3, which covers an immortalized human cell line
comprising the genetic composition of Claim 1, is likewise
patentable subject matter under § 101 as an invention wholly created
from the purified invention claimed in Claim 1. The court in Moore
directly addressed the patentability of human cell lines when it
affirmed that human "cell lines are patentable because '[1long-term
adaptation and growth of human tissues and cells in culture is
difficult-often considered an art.. .,' and the probability of success
is low." Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 142,
793 P.2d 479, 492-93, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 159-60 (1990) (quoting
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES
AND CELLS 33 (1987)) (alteration in original). Although Plaintiffs
claimed cell line was derived from Dolly's precursor cell, the cell's
subsequent isolation, purification, and immortalization in vitro
represent the "inventive effort" rather than the mere "discovery of
naturally occurring raw materials" that Moore distinguishes as that
which patent law rewards. See id.
Isolating a gene sequence, creating nonnaturally occurring gene
combinations, and propagating an immortalized cell line are all
products of time, external effort, ingenuity and creativity. The Bergy
court held "biologically pure cultures" to be patentable subject
matter (manufacture) under § 101 based on the "discovery and skills"
of the scientist used to extract the patented product from a "complex
jungle of microorganisms" which, on its own, could not be used to
produce the invention's desired product of fermentation. See In re
Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 972 (C.C.P.A. 1979), affd, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Similarly, Dolly's original tissue
source, occurring untouched in nature, could not, in its existing state,
provide the valuable research resource that may be used to combat
HIV infection, a use for which Plaintiffs invention is targeted.
Plaintiffs invention, in its physically improved form, withstands
Dolly's attempt to analogize it to a "claim to his heart as an organ"
since his heart has not been transformed in any way. The research
that created this purified form of the Dolly Genome gave rise to a
"manufacture" or "composition of matter" structurally improved
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from its precursor material that thus qualifies as man-made,
patentable subject matter under § 101.
2. The patent satisfies the § 101 utility requirement
a. the current standard ofpharmacological utility under Brenner v.
Manson merely requires that the invention confer a benefit to
society, which is easily met by its potential uses at present and in the
future
The traditional requirement of utility under In re Nelson, 280
F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960), that an invention simply avoids being
"frivolous" or "injurious" to society, has since been relaxed to a
standard that appreciates an invention's utility by the general benefit
conferred to the public. See id. at 178-79. Specifically, courts now
cite the principle laid down in Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519
(1966) to evaluate the utility of a pharmacological invention by
examining "the benefit derived by the public from an invention with
substantial utility." Id. at 534.
The current standard is easily met by Plaintiffs claims.
Plaintiffs discovery of the Dolly Genome's heightened resistance to
HIV, as well as its subsequent isolation in Claim 1 and Claim 2 of
the specific gene combination responsible for this effect, provide
tremendous opportunity for scientific research. The most notable use
for these cells is as a valuable source of anti-HIV compounds, which
can be used to develop anti-HIV drugs. The specific gene
combination may also act as a diagnostic tool for HIV susceptibility.
Plaintiffs immortalized cell line in Claim 3 further provides a
perpetual source of the isolated product of Claim 1, with which the
comparison may be conducted and its methodology improved. The
invention thus greatly benefits the public by providing a model
comparison for present-day IV diagnosis, as well as future
opportunities for research to advance developing treatments or
possible cures of this disease. Plaintiff's invention thereby meets the
standard of substantial utility, and certainly that of nonfrivolous and
noninjurious, to satisfy patentablity under § 101.
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b. the utility in Plaintiff's invention lies in its diagnostic properties
and propagating conditions that permit further, advanced research,
rather than on a separate, "immunity-boosting mechanism"
Dolly asserts that utility in Plaintiff's patent is insufficient
because its claims do not identify specific factors that confer
immunity, and assumes that the patent must necessarily claim an
"immunity-boosting mechanism within either the body or host cell."
These contentions misunderstand judicial interpretation of "the
statutory term 'useful[,]' ... [which] require[s] disclosure of at least
one available practical benefit to the public." Utility Examination
Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1094 (Jan. 5, 2001). As of January
2001, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) revised
its guidelines to incorporate these judicial determinations "by
requiring the disclosure of at least one specific, substantial, and
credible utility." Id. Plaintiff's diagnostic utility alone satisfies this
updated standard, and is similar in utility to that which the court
found in Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp. (In re
Cambridge Biotech Corp.), 186 B.R. 9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995). That
court upheld the use of a diagnostic method for IlV antibody
detection that was useful in determining if a candidate did not have
the disease. See id. at 21. As Plaintiffs expert has indicated, the
current techniques in gene therapy make the Dolly Genome a
potentially valuable tool in the treatment of Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). (See Expert Test. Noriyuki Kasahara,
M.D., Ph.D.) 3 This patent thus meets all current court and PTO-
established standards of substance and benefit.
3. The patent meets the novelty requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 102
The Dolly Genome and the P sequences represent novel
contributions to the art of human genetics. The genome is an
isolated, previously unknown variant of the human genome
sequence. Likewise, there is no evidence of prior use or sale of the
genome as described in the claim.
3. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review will not be publishing the
Expert Testimony of Noriyuki Kasahara referenced in Plaintiff's Points and
Authorities. To obtain a copy of Noriyuki Kasahara's Expert Testimony, see
The Program for Law and Technology at California Institute of Technology &
Loyola Law School Web site, at http://techlaw.lls.edu/atc3/pleadings.html.
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a. the Dolly Genome sequence is novel under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)
The invention is novel unless it was "known or used by others in
this country,... before the invention thereof by the applicant." 35
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). The isolated Dolly Genome was neither
used nor known prior to its discovery by NuGenEra.
i. the published human genome sequence does not anticipate the
Dolly Genome under § 102(a)
Direct anticipation requires identity of the prior art and the
claimed invention. The prior art has to contain "all of the elements
and limitations of the claim... in a single prior reference, arranged
as in the claim." Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d
1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). No prior art reference contains the
Dolly DNA sequence described in the claims. While the human
genomes are similar, the numerous differences between the
published human genome and the Dolly variant rule out direct
anticipation.
ii. the use by Dolly does not anticipate the invention under § 102(a)
The alleged prior use by Dolly has no bearing on patentability,
as he never possessed the invention. Dolly's DNA has certainly been
in use in every one of his trillions of cells from the day he was
conceived. However, the courts have upheld numerous patents for
various compounds isolated from human bodies. Purified hormones
and other human tissue products have been awarded patents despite
the "use" of such compounds by every living human being. Human
adrenalin and human prostaglandins have been patented. Likewise,
isolated fragments of human DNA are patentable.
Anticipation under § 102(a) requires preexisting knowledge that
makes the subsequent invention redundant. Dolly possessed no
knowledge of the sequence or the unique properties of his DNA.
NuGenEra obtained this knowledge when it isolated and sequenced
the Dolly Genome. The result is a valuable tool for biomedical
science.
A new property or use does not make a known composition of
matter patentable. See In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir.
1990). In this case, however, the composition of the Dolly DNA was
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unknown. NuGenEra discovered both the new composition and the
unique properties of the Dolly Genome.
b. actions by AGTC do not anticipate or invalidate the invention
Likewise, AGTC has not possessed a complete invention. The
genetic testing of DNA and limited studies AGTC performed fall
short of the statutory requirements for a bar to patentability.
i. the genetic testing of Dolly's DNA by AGTC does not anticipate
the isolation and sequencing by NuGenEra under § 102(a)
AGTC withdrew Dolly's blood for genetic testing. However,
AGTC was neither aware of, nor interested in, the properties of the
entire genome. The testing was limited to a few genes that
concerned Dolly at the time. The tests verified a few nucleotides as
being nonmutant. The bulk of the DNA was a mere byproduct of
testing. AGTC abandoned the sample and later sold it as an
unneeded byproduct. The Supreme Court has long held that where
the substances "were accidentally and unwittingly produced, whilst
the operators were in pursuit of other and different results, without
exciting attention," such production does not anticipate a future
discovery of the same substance. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707,
711-12 (1880). Accordingly, the unused Dolly DNA stored in
AGTC's test tubes does not anticipate the future discoveries by
NuGenEra.
ii. the tests conducted by AGTC do not anticipate the sequencing of
the entire Dolly Genome under § 102(a)
The exact procedures employed by AGTC are absent from the
record. However, one thing is certain: AGTC did not sequence the
entire six billion base pairs of the Dolly Genome. Thus, the
composition of matter determined by AGTC is only a small part of
the one contained in the claim. These limited tests carried out by
AGTC do not rise to the level of anticipating knowledge or use under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a). The Federal Circuit repeatedly noted that an
anticipating prior art must contain the entire invention.
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iii. the sale of blood by AGTC is not anticipating under § 102(b)
As AGTC did not possess the invention, it could not have
engaged in a sale that would invoke a statutory bar under 35 U.S.C. §
102(b). The Dolly blood sold to NuGenEra was only a first step in
the inventive process. A sale of an incomplete invention can create a
§ 102(b) bar. The seller would have needed to have gone beyond a
mere conception. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys.
Corp., 825 F. Supp. 65, 69 (D. Del. 1993), aff'd, 72 F.3d 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the terms of the sale must reflect the value
of the invention if it works as expected. In this case, AGTC had no
idea of the unique features of the Dolly Genome or its potential
value. The circumstances of the sale and the bulk transfer of the
unused samples suggest that Dolly's blood was sold for "scrap
value."
c. the alleged use by Dolly and AGTC was private and not
disqualifying under § 102(b)
Patent laws reward an inventor not only for the creative effort
but also for delivering the invention to the public. Therefore, secret,
nondisclosing use does not preclude patentability.
Dolly "used" his DNA within the context of his own bodily
functions that are unquestionably private. Such functions are in fact
protected from the public by the United States Constitution. The
Supreme Court recognizes the fundamental right of personal privacy
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). At the same time, one's tissue can be used by the public
once it leaves the body. See Moore, 51 Cal. at 143-48, 793 P.2d at
494-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161-64. This distinction further
underscores the fact that what happens within the body has no
bearing on the future fate of human biological material.
The use of DNA by AGTC was likewise private. Whatever
limited testing it performed was protected by the confidentiality
agreement. (See Pl.'s Compl., App. A.) The Supreme Court looks at
such explicit agreements as "injunction[s] of secrecy" when
determining whether the use was public. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104
U.S. 333, 336 (1881).
Whatever the use by Dolly and AGTC may have been, the
public could not benefit from it. Implied or express privacy
considerations kept the information from the public domain. Such
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secret use cannot bar NuGenEra from being rewarded for giving the
public access to a valuable medical research tool.
4. The patent meets the nonobviousness requirement under
35 U.S.C. § 103
The prior art is limited to genomes of persons other than Dolly.
A multitude of important sequence differences distinguish the Dolly
Genome from the prior art. Some of these variations confer a
resistance to HIV. The level of ordinary skill in molecular biology
does not allow one to predict sequence variations that will result in a
particular phenotype. Extensive efforts are being undertaken to
identify genetic variations similar to Dolly's.
The isolated Dolly Genome as a whole and the isolated Dolly
P1-PlO locus are nonobvious under the test set out in Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), which courts use to determine
obviousness as a question of law. As discussed in turn below, the
following factors are considered: (1) the scope and content of the
prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the patent
claims at issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the
invention was made; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness,
such as commercial success, unfilled need, and the failure of others
to solve the problem. See id. at 17-18.
a. the state ofprior art is limited to gene sequences of other
individuals and cannot anticipate the Dolly Genome sequence
because every individual's genome is unique
The prior art cited by Defendant Dolly is the published "human
genome." See J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human
Genome, 291 SCIENCE 1304 (2001). The "genome" consists of the
DNA sequence of all the twenty-four human chromosomes (twenty-
two autosomes, and the X and the Y chromosomes). The definition
of "human" is far less precise because no two individuals (with the
exception of identical twins) have exactly the same sequence. The
mere fact that DNA is used for personal identification is proof that
each individual has a unique genome. The sequenced human
genome is derived from several donors but not Dolly. The scope of
the prior art is therefore limited to the DNA of those individuals
whose DNA has been used for sequencing.
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b. estimated differences between the prior art and the invention are
great
The second prong of the Deere test inquires whether there are
differences between the prior art and the claimed invention. Plaintiff
NuGenEra needs merely to state the facts. Independent Claim 1
comprises the entire Dolly Genome. A direct comparison of the
claimed sequence to the prior art human genome sequence is
estimated to reveal millions of differences. Independent Claim 2
comprises the ten genes of the P1-P10 sequences. Each gene differs
by one or more nucleotides from the prior art genome.
c. level of ordinary skill in the art is not yet sophisticated enough to
have predicted the sequence of the Dolly Genome
The third inquiry deals with the level of the ordinary skill in the
art at the time of the invention. Many sophisticated techniques in
molecular biology have become standard practice. However, no
method exists (chemical, biological or computer based) capable of
predicting specific useful variations in human DNA.
The Federal Circuit has established that for a novel DNA
sequence to be obvious, the actual sequence of As, Cs, Gs and Ts
must be obvious to a practitioner looking at prior art sequences. See
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1207-09
(Fed. Cir. 1991). In the present case, by looking at three billion base
pairs of the prior art human genome, one must be able to suggest
every one of thousands of specific substitutions that would create the
Dolly Genome-the blueprint for all of Dolly's unique
characteristics. In the case of Claim 2, one must envision the
substitutions in the published sequence that will convert the P1-PlO
genes into their HIV resistant variants.
i. obvious methods do not render the result obvious
Defendant Dolly argues that the inventors isolated the Dolly
Genome using standard methods (i.e., the entire procedure would
have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art of
molecular biology). However, the Federal Circuit has long held that
the mere availability of the technology and the incentive to apply it
do not make the result obvious. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559
(Fed. Cir. 1995). Similarly, a conceived method of preparation of
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some undefined DNA does not define it with precision sufficient to
render it obvious. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1208-09. The inventors'
interest in Dolly's iIV resistance provided the "incentive to apply
the technology" and suggested an obvious direction of research.
This "obvious to try" standard was explicitly rejected by the Federal
Circuit inIn re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
ii. the Dolly Genome is nonobvious under the "similar compound"
test
A novel chemical may be obvious if its structure and properties
are similar to a prior art chemical. See In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688,
692 (Fed. Cir. 1990). It is nonobvious ifa similar structure possesses
unexpected new properties. See id. at 693. Arguably, the Dolly
Genome is very similar to other sequenced human genomes.
However, multiple nucleotide substitutions distinguish Dolly from
the prior art DNA sequence. In addition, at least one property is
remarkable and unexpected; complete HIV resistance. Under the
Dillon standard the prima facie case of obviousness is easily
rebutted.
d. objective evidence from the medical research community supports
the nonobviousness of this invention
Finally, the Federal Circuit looks at the objective evidence of
nonobviousness. These "secondary considerations" include
commercial success of the invention, unfilled need, and failure by
others to arrive at the same result.
As the scientific expert has indicated, a major effort is currently
under way to identify genetic variations such as Dolly's. The Dolly
Genome holds significant promise for researchers in the field.
NuGenEra chose to make a large investment in labor and capital in
order to develop the CL100 cell line. Commercial success is further
manifested by Dolly's sale of his blood to at least two scientists. The
testimony of Plaintiffs expert clearly points to the need for such
material in the medical research community.
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C. As a Matter of Public Policy, PlaintiffShould Be Granted
Ownership of Its Research and the Right to Exclude Others from the
Profits Generated from It
1. NuGenEra has the right to own and profit from the results of its
research
Should courts permit people to sell their DNA in violation of a
patent, they would severely limit incentives for genetic research.
Prior to testing and/or sequencing, companies have no concept as to
the value of the DNA in their possession. Companies have to invest
their own resources for a chance to find a useful sequence among
hundreds and thousands of genomes. What company would expend
limited resources of time and money if it had no chance of profiting
from its labor? If courts granted this right to profit to individuals
who happen to have a favorable genome, rather than to the company
that expended its resources to find the genome, its utility and
sequence, no company would conduct genetic research under such
uncertain conditions.
If one individual could patent his genome, what is to stop
everybody from doing so? For the most part, everybody is unique.
It could be argued that everybody possesses unique qualities that are
beneficial. Would one identical twin have the right to profit over the
other? The obvious result would be a disaster to both ongoing
research and future research. Gene patents already awarded to
biological and chemical companies would be invalidated, and the
entire Human Genome Project could become the property of people
whose DNA has already been sequenced. This would most certainly
hinder future research by removing necessary incentives for
companies to perform genetic research.
2. NuGenEra is the owner of the results from its research
In this case, NuGenEra should have the right to profit from its
research. NuGenEra exerted time and money to find a genome that
contains HIV resistance. It bore the cost of sequencing the genome,
finding the genes that code for resistance, and created a cell line with
the genome. It is NuGenEra that made the investment to find a
useful genome and turn that genome into something usable. Thus,
NuGenEra should be able to profit from it.
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3. Dolly is not an inventor or contributor to NuGenEra's results
Dolly should not be able to profit from his unusual genome
because all he holds is a product of nature. See Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980). He could no more patent
his DNA than he could patent his body or his organs. As the source
of the blood sample, he has made no discovery and produced no
invention from which to profit. See Brown v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 866 F. Supp. 439, 442, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1994). The blood in his
veins and the DNA in the nuclei of his cells are "products of
nature-the manifest results of over three billion years of
reproduction, natural selection, and evolutionary processes unbroken
in Dolly's unique phylogenetic line since the origin of life on this
planet." (Def's Answer at 3.)4 Dolly would not have even known
he was immune to HIV had it not been for NuGenEra's research.
Because Dolly played no part in the discovery of his HIV immunity,
the sequencing of his genome, the identification of the genes that
cause HIV resistance, or the creation of the cell line containing his
genome, he is in no way the discoverer or the inventor of the claims
held in NuGenEra's patent. His existence does not entitle him to
profit.
4. Dolly does not have the right to sell his genome
Dolly was able to sell his genome, in the form of blood, by
offering it as HIV resistant. Dolly learned of his immunity from
NuGenEra. Without this information obtained from NuGenEra,
Dolly would not have been able to sell his blood for any more money
than anyone else. The knowledge he gained from NuGenEra should
not give him the right to cheat NuGenEra out of profits from its
research.
As the PTO stated, "[tlhe patent system promotes progress by
securing a complete disclosure of an... inventor's legal right to
exclude other people from making, using, offering for sale, selling,
or importing the composition for a limited time." Utility
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093-94 (Jan. 5, 2001).
4. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review will not be publishing the
Answer referenced in Plaintiff's Points and Authorities. To obtain a copy of
the Answer, see The Program for Law and Technology at California Institute
of Technology & Loyola Law School Web site, at http://techlaw.lls.edu/
atc3/pleadings.html.
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Therefore, NuGenEra should be able to profit from its useful
invention, the Dolly Genome.
Society stands to gain in many ways by allowing companies to
profit from genetic research. Genetic research may lead to treatment
for diseases, or even cures. However, the most that could be gained
by allowing individuals the right to sell their genome is a profit for
that individual. And even that profit is unlikely, as companies would
be unwilling to pay for materials from which they could never profit.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Dolly retains no inherent
genomic rights to his excised tissue. Moreover, public policy allows
the grant of this patent as it promotes valuable research
opportunities. Finally, the '271 patent is valid and Plaintiff states a
valid infringement claim. Thus, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment should be granted.
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